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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Case No. 20489 
vs. 
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Can an express warranty arise when a contractor 
supplies equipment for use by a subcontractor, even though no 
warranty was intended? 
2. Can performance of a pre-existing contractual obliga-
tion in reliance on a factual representation constitute consid-
eration for an express warranty not tied to the sale or leasing 
of goods? 
3. Did the district court err in refusing to find as a 
matter of law that the rope used was adequate for the antici-
pated wire flying operation and that the alleged breach of 
warranty did not cause either the crash or the alleged injury? 
4. Did the court's instructions to the jury erroneously 
inform the jury that express warranties are absolute and are 
subject to no limitations or objective standards? 
5. Did the district court err in admitting into evidence 
a chart, which was first offered the day after both parties had 
rested, summarizing an economist's direct testimony without 
allowance for concessions made on cross-examination? 
6. Did the district court err in refusing to grant defen-
dant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and 
fraud on the court? 
7. Did the district court err in awarding prejudgment 
interest when the jury resolved the case on a general verdict 
which did not distinguish between special and general damages? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities which appellant believes to be 
directly dispositive of any of the issues in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries 
and property damage arising out of a helicopter crash on 
May 24, 1977. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
This case was first tried in January, 1981. Before that 
trial, the trial court resolved plaintiffs' claims of res ipsa 
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loquitur and strict liability against them. (R. 143.) Plain-
tiffs* claims for breach of express and implied warranty were 
dismissed at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence (R. 223), 
and the issue of negligence was submitted to the jury. The 
jury found that neither party had been negligent. (R. 229.) 
On plaintiffs' appeal following the first trial, this court 
ruled that the issue of express warranty should have been 
submitted to the jury, and remanded the case for retrial of 
that issue and the issue of damages. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 
P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) . 
The express warranty claim was tried to a jury on 
October 30 through November 9, 1984. The jury found in favor 
of plaintiffs, awarding damages to plaintiff Groen of $975,000 
and to plaintiff Rocky Mountain of $37,500 (R. 1602.) The 
district court entered judgment on the general verdict on 
November 30, 1984. (R. 1599-1601.) On December 3, 1984, the 
district court by memorandum decision denied defendant's Alter-
native Motions for Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict and New Trial. (R. 1603-10.) The order to that 
effect was entered on January 9, 1985. (R. 1625-26). Defen-
dant filed its Notice of Appeal on February 4, 1985. (R. 
1629A.) 
Statement of Facts 
In May 1977, defendant Tri-O, actually a subcontractor but, 
for simplicity, referred to herein as contractor, was stringing 
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power lines near Wellington, Colorado. It subcontracted with 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters ("Rocky Mountain") to provide a 
helicopter and pilot to string the lines in an operation called 
"flying wire." (Tr. 714.) The process of flying wire requires 
a helicopter to pull a "sock line" consisting of a lead rope 
approximately 100 feet long attached to a much longer 3/8 inch 
cable, along the electrical towers. The helicopter pilot lays 
the line into "fly travelers" which hang from the tower arms 
and which close around the line after insertion. 
On May 24, 1977, Groen was flying Rocky Mountain's heli-
copter pulling the sock line. While Groen was stringing the 
line, the line snagged on a tower arm, causing the lead rope to 
break and become entangled in the helicopter's controls. 
Although the rotors continued to turn, preventing a free-fall, 
Groen lost control and the helicopter crashed. Groen alleges 
that, although he continued to work as a pilot until July, 
1982, more than four years after the accident, (Tr. 625), the 
impact caused him back injuries which have resulted in severe 
headaches and an inability to hold gainful employment. 
On retrial, plaintiffs1 sole theory for recovery was that 
Tri-O, through a supervisor at the job site, expressly war-
ranted the adequacy of the rope for the wire flying operation. 
Tri-0 denied that any warranty was made, contended that Groen's 
speed and method of flying were not and could not have been 
contemplated and that the speed and method of flying were the 
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s o l e causes of t he acc iden t , and claimed t h a t at the speed 
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p r o p y l e n e r o p e a v a i l a b l e f o i l e a d topes . , i n c l u d i n g 1/2 n u l l 
7 /8 i n c h I mi I I 1-1/4 inch and 1 1/2 i n c h r o p o iTi Mi 
I III 1 I III I II I III I I III I 1 III 1 III II III I I III III III III I III III III I I II I III I I I III III III III III I III III III II 1 « H 1 1 
t h e c h o i c e of h i ? t wo pi c d n m s o r s on t h e nob. 
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I. i nii.li, in I'omrnonly nir.n! HIM], expui l e n c e d | i l U u Inn i j f i in t j j i iy 
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2 4 5 , i i l l i 1 1 ! 11 i l l i 11 I l i l l i 11mi I II I ui' HI II II I, III I n 1 ( h i 1 m l 1 II II 
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t r i a l , p l a i n t l i t d i d not make an i s s u e ovet t h e d i a m e t e r ol 
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the second trial, Groen contended that he requested 3/4 inch 
Samson rope. (Tr. 81-86.) This distinction is important 
because it was established at the first trial and uncontested 
at the second trial that 1/2 inch Samson rope would also have 
broken under the alleged facts. (Tr. 1112.) 
Plaintiffs contended that two express warranties were 
made. First, they contended that Tri-O's superintendent, Ken 
Clinger, represented that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was 
as strong as 3/4 inch Samson rope. The evidence at trial was 
uncontroverted and defendant readily admits that the 1/2 inch 
Columbia PD-10 polypropylene rope is not as strong as 3/4 inch 
Samson rope. It was further uncontroverted that 3/4 inch 
Samson rope would not have broken in this case. (Tr. 1115-17.) 
Second, plaintiffs contended that Tri-0 through Clinger 
warranted the rope to be adequate for the wire flying opera-
tion. Tri-0 contended that even though no warranty was 
intended or made, the rope was in fact adequate for the job and 
that, if such a warranty was made, it was limited by an assump-
tion that Groen would fly the wire in the manner customary 
among other experienced pilots. Mr. Clinger, however, denied 
representing that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was as strong 
as 3/4 inch Samson. (Tr. 751.) 
Groen grossly varied from usual flying technique in two 
ways, neither of which was anticipated when the alleged war-
ranty was made: his excessive speed and the manner in which he 
-6-
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(Tr. lOlii I I he maximum speed any witness had seen anyone fly 
wire under conditions similar to those nn the job on which the 
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p e r hour 
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The second aspect of Groen's flying technique which 
deviated from the norm was his practice of laying the lead rope 
against the insulators from which the fly arm was suspended, 
rather than into the fly arm itself. (Tr. 1010-11.) Using 
this method, he would sometimes miss the traveler and land the 
rope on the tower arm itself. On the tower prior to the snag, 
Groen had laid the rope on the arm. (Tr. 101.) The evidence 
was that other pilots avoid laying the rope on the arm, and if 
they happen to do so, they stop and carefully lift the rope 
because of the probability of a snag. (Tr. 870-71, 910-11, 
1013.) 
The accident was caused when the lead rope which Groen was 
pulling snagged while Groen dragged it across the tower arm. 
(Tr. 101.) Groen admitted that he was going too fast to stop. 
(Tr. 728.) The rope stretched, broke and whipped back into the 
helicopter controls, which caused Groen to lose control and 
crash. (Tr. 101-02.) The blades continued to spin, however, 
which prevemted the craft from free-falling to the ground. 
(Tr. 101-03, 1125-27.) Defendant asserts that Groen's misuse 
of the rope, rather than its inadequacy or failure to meet a 
warranted standard, caused the accident, and that Groen's use 
was outside the scope of the warranty, in that Groen's exces-
sive speed and his unorthodox method of flying were not 
reasonably foreseen or anticipated by Tri-0 at the time the 
alleged warranty was made. 
-8-
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A. The law of warranty has historically been con-
fined to commercial transactions analogous to a sale of goods. 
Until this court's prior decision in this case, it had never 
been extended to cover equipment supplied by a contractor to a 
subcontractor for use in performing contracted work. 
B. Extension of the law of warranty beyond the sale 
of goods analogy imposes strict liability for innocent misrep-
resentations. The action is based partially on deceit and 
partially on breach of contract. Unlike the plaintiff in a 
deceit action, however, the plaintiff in this action was not 
required to prove fault. Further, unlike the plaintiff in a 
breach of contract action, the plaintiff in this action was not 
required to prove that the defendant intended to make a war-
ranty. In essence, any statement alleged to have been made by 
a supervisor on a job site relating to working conditions or 
equipment becomes a warranty if relied upon. 
C. If a new cause of action for breach of express 
warranty outside the sale of goods analogy is to be created, it 
should be created only by the legislature. Judicial creation 
of such a cause of action is inappropriate because the court is 
not equipped to adjust and accommodate the conflicting inter-
ests involved and is not equipped to immediately define the 
elements of the cause of action and the defenses thereto. 
D. A new cause of action for breach of an express 
work place warranty should be created prospectively only, 
-10-
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A. Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that their 
injuries were caused by the alleged breach of warranty. 
Defendant's expert witness testified that if the rope had not 
broken, the same accident or a worse accident would have 
occurred due to structural failure of the helicopter. 
B. The only evidence offered by plaintiffs on the 
issue of causation was the opinion of Gary Flandro, which was 
without foundation and was inadmissible. Flandro testified 
that the helicopter structure might have failed in a different 
place than the place identified by defendant's expert. His 
testimony, however, was based solely on examination of photo-
graphs on the witness stand, and he admitted that he lacked any 
personal knowledge of the facts on which he testified. 
C. An express warranty must be limited in scope to 
that obligation which the warrantor agreed to assume, and is 
premised on the theory that the plaintiff will use the product 
within the scope of the warranty. Groen's method of flying was 
grossly unorthodox and was not contemplated or disclosed at the 
time the warranty was made. The warranty must be assumed to 
extend only to reasonable methods of flying, and not to Groen's 
unorthodox methods. 
IV. The jury instructions in this case were unduly 
slanted in favor of the plaintiff in that they created the 
erroneous impression that warranties are absolute and without 
limitation. 
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VI. The lower court erroneously admitted into evidence a 
summary of an economist's testimony which was not offered until 
after both sides had rested and which failed to reflect in any 
manner concessions the witness made on cross-examination. 
VII. The jury's award of damages was clearly excessive in 
light of the evidence. At the first trial, the jury found 
damages of $212,000. At the second trial, the jury found 
damages of $975,000 based on the same evidence and based on 
evidence which dictated a lower, rather than higher, award. 
VIII. The jury resolved the case on a general verdict which 
did not distinguish between special and general damages. The 
district court committed error in presuming that the jury would 
have awarded Groen all of the special damages which he claimed 
and in then awarding prejudgment interest thereon. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT SUPPORT APPLI-
CATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
At the first trial of this case in 1981, the trial judge 
ruled that the case sounded in tort, not contract, and that the 
facts as alleged neither supported nor fit within the doctrines 
of express or implied warranty. On appeal, this court reversed 
and remanded the case for retrial, ruling that the doctrine of 
express warranty was applicable. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 
598 (Utah 1983). A record has now been developed in the lower 
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The court, however, summarily held that an express warranty 
of fitness could arise outside the commercial sale or lease of 
goods, and analyzed this case in terms of the existence of a 
factual dispute. Id. at 606. The holding that an express 
warranty can arise at a job site when a contractor supplies 
equipment for use by a subcontractor creates a fundamental 
change in the allocation of job site risks and should be 
re-examined. Except for this court's prior decision in this 
case, there is no case which has extended the law of express 
warranty beyond the sale (or lease) of goods and into the realm 
of the workplace. 
A. The Court's Ruling in This Case Has Created Strict 
Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation. 
Extension of the law of warranty as this court has done 
creates a new cause of action falling between breach of con-
tract and deceit. It is, in essence, an action for misrepre-
sentation without fault. It is composed of some, but not all, 
of the elements of negligence and contract, but takes from each 
in a way that requires the plaintiff to assert nothing more 
than reliance on an untrue affirmation of fact. 
Courts have uniformly and consistently refused as a matter 
of public policy to extend the tort of misrepresentation to 
encompass innocent misrepresentations because the defendant in 
such circumstances is exposed to draconian liability without 
intent, fault or an understanding that it is doing so, and 
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without having breached a contract, just as the defendant in 
this case has done. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law 
of Torts 748-49 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter "Prosser & 
Keeton"). Unlike the plaintiff in an action for negligent 
misrepresentation, the plaintiff in this newly created cause of 
action does not have to prove negligence or other fault on the 
part of the defendant. See Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 
P.2d 382, 384-85 (1962). 
Neither is the plaintiff in this new cause of action 
required to assert or prove the usual elements of a claim based 
on contract. See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 
427, 428 (1961); E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137 
P.2d 342, 346 (1943). This court's earlier ruling in this case 
means that a warranty can exist despite the fact that no war-
ranty was actually or reasonably intended. 667 P.2d at 606. 
In the context of a sale of goods, the elimination of the 
intent to make a warranty is justified on the grounds that the 
warranty is considered a part of the bargained-for considera-
tion and there is thus an objective manifestation of an inten-
tion to be bound. Prosser & Keeton at 748. When a selling 
party makes an affirmation of fact, it is presumed that he 
intended such affirmation to induce the other contracting party 
to enter the sale agreement. 
The asserted warranty in this case, however, is different. 
Unlike the usual warranty, which is tied to an exchange of 
-17-
goods or other property and is part of the inducement for the 
exchange, this warranty, if it exists, exists independent of 
any other exchange, because the original contract had already 
been consummated. Thus, its only elements are a misrepresenta-
tion of fact and reliance thereon. In effect, the court has 
done indirectly that which courts have unanimously refused to 
do directly: impose strict liability for any representation of 
fact which turns out to be untrue. 
B. The Creation of a Cause of Action for Warranty Outside 
the Sale or Leasing of Goods Should Be Left to the 
Legislature. 
This court has ruled in this case that an employee of a 
subcontractor on a job may sue the contractor for breach of a 
warranty made by a supervisor at the worksite, even though 
neither the supervisor nor the contractor intended a warranty 
and even though both acted without fault. Such has not been 
the law. If it is to become the law, the choice is for the 
legislature, not the court, not only because the choice in-
volves an adjustment and accommodation of conflicting interests 
which this court is ill-equipped to make, see Bastian v. King, 
661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), but also because the legislature 
can define in the enactment both the elements of the cause of 
action and the defenses thereto. 
These considerations are particularly important in the case 
at bar. Defendant has been charged with making an oral express 
-18-
warranty that a rope was strong enough for use in flying wire. 
According to the court's instructions, the jury was told that 
any limitation to such warranty also had to be expressed, and 
that if none was expressed, the warranty was unlimited. 
(Instruction No. 13, R. 1544.) 
The Uniform Commercial Code, which the lower court used as 
a guide in defining the elements of warranty, provides the 
broad definitions of warranties used in this case, Utah Code 
Ann. S 70A-2-313 (1980), but also provides protections to 
ensure that a warranty is not unjustly found or applied. The 
warranty upon which plaintiffs rely in this case, however, was 
not made in connection with the sale of goods, and the 
statutory provisions are thus inapplicable, ^d. § 70A-2-102. 
Because this court's language in its prior decision defining 
the elements of the warranty was parallel to the broad language 
of the U.C.C., plaintiff's burden of proving consideration for 
and intention to make the warranty was substantially relaxed or 
eliminated, but defendant was not given the benefit of the 
statutory defenses and limitations which are the quid pro quo 
for the broad U.C.C. definition of warranty. Tri-0 was not 
given the opportunity to disclaim the warranty or its liability 
for consequential damages, id. §§ 70A-2-316, -719 (1980), and 
was not given the opportunity to claim the benefit of the 
statute of frauds, id. S 70A-2-201. 
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The facts of this case demonstrate the injustice of the 
doctrine which the court has created. The first discussions 
between Tri-0 and Groen regarding the rope occurred after Groen 
arrived at the job in Colorado on May 22, 1977. (Tr. 737.) 
The contract or agreement between Rocky Mountain and Tri-0 was 
consummated between May 17 and 20, 1977. (Ex. D-18.) There is 
absolutely no claim or evidence that the rope was even dis-
cussed by Rocky Mountain and Tri-0 at the time of contracting, 
much less that any representations regarding the rope were part 
of the bargain when the agreement was reached. (Tr. 598-600, 
737-39.) The only reasonable inferences are that Tri-0 did not 
intend to warrant the rope used and that Rocky Mountain did not 
bargain for such a warranty. 
The only defense which Tri-0 was permitted to assert was 
that Groen used the rope outside the scope of the alleged 
warranty. That defense, however, was ineffectual, both because 
of the court's instruction that the scope of the warranty is 
unlimited unless limitations are explicitly stated (Instruction 
No. 13, R. 1544), and because of Groen1s apparent willingness 
to change his testimony to meet the particular theory of his 
case. The dangers of creating a cause of action without care-
fully considered safeguards against abuse are demonstrated in 
this case. At the first trial, Groen testified that the 
alleged warranty was that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was 
Has strong as" Samson rope. There was no actual mention of 
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size, but his exemplar rope was 1/2 inch and the reasonable 
inference was that the comparison was of the same diameter. 
The evidence at the first trial, even through his own expert, 
was uncontroverted that 1/2 inch Samson and 1/2 inch poly-
propylene ropes would break at the same speed, under 30 miles 
per hour. (Tr. of first trial 606, 613.) 
At the second trial, Groen modified his version of the 
facts, claiming that he asked not just for Samson rope, but 
that he asked for 3/4 inch Samson rope, because it was the only 
rope he had ever used. (Tr. 81-86.) Concededly, 1/2 inch 
polypropylene rope is not as strong as 3/4 inch Samson rope. 
The evidence, however, showed that Groen had never used Samson 
rope on prior jobs. Groen identified each prior wire pulling 
job he had flown. There were three: a Commonwealth Electric 
job in Idaho, a Commonwealth Electric job in Colorado and a San 
Miguel Power Company job near Montrose, Colorado. (Tr. 178, 
179.) Groen testified that he used Samson rope on each. (Tr. 
188, 204, 207.) 
Larry Wehrli was the superintendent on the Idaho 
Commonwealth job. He was present for the entire job and 
watched Groen pull wire. Samson rope was never used to pull 
wire on that job. Groen used the exact type of rope introduced 
at trial as the rope used in the Tri-0 job. (Tr. 356-363.) 
Wehrli was a friend of Groen's (R. 180) and Groen had even 
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asked him before the first trial what type of rope was used on 
the Idaho Commonwealth job. (Tr. 363-366.) 
John David was a lineman who worked with Groen on the 
Colorado Commonwealth job. In fact, Mr. David sat in the 
towers and passed the rope through the travelers as Groen 
pulled it in by helicopter. (This was a hand pass operation 
and fly travelers were not used.) Again, polypropylene rope, 
like that used in the Tri-0 job, was used by Groen on this 
Commonwealth job. (Tr. 893, 898-899.) 
Finally, Frank Graybeal, an employee of San Miguel Power 
Company, testified he was present and observed Groen for the 
entire job near Montrose, Colorado. That job was totally 
different. The poles were wood. No travelers were used. The 
line was simply laid on top of the wood cross arms. No Samson 
rope was used on the job. In fact, no lead rope was used on 
this job. (Tr. 670-674.) 
Because there was no requirement of a writing and no oppor-
tunity to disclaim the warranty, and because the jury was 
instructed that the warranty was unrestricted when no restric-
tions were explicitly stated, Tri-0 was in effect without a 
defense to Groen's claim. 
The injustice was aggravated by Groen's failure, at the 
time the alleged warranty was made, to disclose that his method 
of flying involved laying the rope on the tower arm, which 
makes snags more likely, and that he intended to fly almost 
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three times faster than other pilots performing the same opera-
tion. Because the action was not a negligence action, defen-
dant could not assert the defenses of contributory fault and 
assumption of risk. Because the action was not a contract 
action, the plaintiff was not required to prove offer, accep-
tance or mutual assent, and defendant was not allowed to defend 
on the basis of lack of intent to make a contract or mistake. 
Moreover, consideration was presumed to exist by virtue of 
reliance on the alleged warranty, even though such reliance was 
also an element of the warranty claim itself. (See Point II 
below.) The upshot is that the court has created a new cause 
of action without providing necessary safeguards and without 
guidance as to the defenses which might be available, and 
defendant herein has been caught in the transition. 
Finally, sound policy reasons dictate that express warran-
ties outside the sale of goods analogy should not exist, espe-
cially in the environment of the workplace. Without a require-
ment of a writing, and without a requirement of independent 
consideration to ensure that the party charged with making a 
warranty understands the nature of the undertaking, any state-
ment alleged to have been made by a supervisor on a job site 
relating to working conditions or equipment becomes a warranty 
if relied upon. As this case demonstrates, there is no 
limitation on the scope of liability which the employer may 
incur, and no way of adequately protecting the employer from 
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exaggerated or false claims. In essence, the court has imposed 
strict liability for misrepresentation, requiring neither 
intentional nor negligent conduct, and without the usual ele-
ments of a breach of contract action. Such liability has never 
been recognized before, and the decision creating such liabil-
ity in this case should be overruled. 
c
- A New Cause of Action for Breach of an Express Work-
place Warranty Should not be Created Retroactively. 
If this court determines that a new cause of action should 
be created for breach of an express workplace warranty, that 
new cause of action should be created prospectively only. In 
the analogous context of determining the effect of an overrul-
ing decision on persons who entered business or other relation-
ships in actual or implicit reliance or current law at the time 
the relationship was created, this court has held as follows: 
[W]here persons had entered into contracts and other 
business relationships based upon justifiable reliance 
on the prior decisions of courts, those persons would 
be substantially harmed if retroactive effect were 
given to overruling decisions. 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1972). 
In the case at bar, the court should not apply retro-
actively a decision creating a new cause of action for breach 
of express warranty in the workplace. The parties to this 
action negotiated an agreement which required in part that 
defendant supply plaintiffs with rope and other equipment for 
_ 0 A _ 
use in flying wire. Had the parties been aware that their 
actions might involve creation of a warranty regarding the 
rope, provisions could have been negotiated into the agreement 
which would have protected both parties. If the decision is 
applied retroactively, however, defendant suffers a great 
injustice by being exposed to a liability in excess of one 
million dollars based on a risk which it did not intend or 
agree to assume and from which it could have been protected by 
negotiation. 
POINT II 
THE ALLEGED EXPRESS WARRANTY IN THIS CASE IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION AND IS THERE-
FORE UNENFORCEABLE. 
It is undisputed that no consideration exchanged hands in 
the creation of the alleged warranty in this case, because the 
alleged warranty was made after the final agreement between 
Tri-0 and Rocky Mountain to fly wire had been reached. Plain-
tiff admitted in open court that there was no consideration and 
claimed that his agreement to fly in reliance upon the alleged 
warranty was a substitute therefore. (Tr. 737-38.) Such reli-
ance was insufficient to act as a substitute for consideration. 
A. If Reliance Is Permitted to Substitute for Considera-
tion in This Case, The Court Will Create a Strict 
Liability Remedy for Misrepresentation. 
As detailed above, the tort of misrepresentation is made up 
of three basic elements: a misrepresentation, fault and 
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reliance. The cause of action for warranty in this case lacks 
the requirements of fault, leaving as its only elements misrep-
resentation and reliance. 
In its prior decision in this case, this court defined the 
elements of the express warranty of fitness as follows: 
Any direct and positive affirmation of fact, as dis-
tinguished from mere opinion or judgment, made by one 
party to the contract that induces the other party to 
act in reliance thereon constitutes an express 
warranty. 
667 P.2d at 606. The court, however, acknowledged the contrac-
tual nature of warranty, id. at 604, and Justice Howe, concur-
ring, stated that the express warranty would have to be sup-
ported by new consideration. Id. at 607. 
Naked reliance cannot be a substitute for consideration in 
this case because reliance is also an element of the warranty 
itself. By definition, wherever a warranty exists, reliance 
must also exist. If reliance on the misrepresentation were 
sufficient to establish consideration for a warranty, consid-
eration in an express warranty case would be established as a 
matter of law in all cases without inquiry. In order to 
recover, the plaintiff would only be required to show that the 
statement was made, that it was untrue, and that he relied upon 
it. The district court in the instant case effectively so 
found by ruling that reliance was established as a matter of 
law: 
It was the Court's opinion and still is, that if the 
jury found that the alleged warranty had been made, 
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that it was as a matter of law the type of statement 
upon which the defendant should expect that the plain-
tiff would rely. (R. 1607.) 
Plainly, the result is to make the defendant strictly 
liable for all misrepresentations of fact. The law, except as 
created by this case, has never extended so far and should not 
do so. Because plaintiffs can show no other consideration for 
the alleged warranty, the case should be reversed and remanded 
for entry of judgment in favor of defendant. 
B. Groen's Performance of a Pre-existing Contractual Duty 
in Reliance on the Alleged Express Warranty Was Under 
General Contract Principles an Inadequate Substitute 
for Consideration. 
Even if this court holds that reliance on an alleged war-
ranty is sufficient consideration for the warranty, Groen's 
reliance on the alleged warranty in this case was in perfor-
mance of a pre-existing contractual duty and thus cannot 
constitute consideration for the later "warranty". It is a 
settled principle of contract law that a contracting party, 
once obligated to perform under contract, cannot exact from the 
other party a further contractual promise without giving some 
further consideration for that promise: 
Under no conceivable theory can the doing of an act 
which a party is already obligated to do, constitute 
the consideration for a new promise on the part of the 
other party. 
Van Tassel v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 350, 355 (1950). 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs were already under a contractual 
obligation to fly the wire when the statements concerning the 
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rope were made. Thus, any warranties concerning the rope, 
being contractual in nature, must be supported by some consid-
eration beyond merely agreeing to fly the wire that day. 
The requirement that the alleged assurances as to rope 
strength be supported by consideration is derived from contract 
law. In Zimzow Construction Co. v. Giovannoni, 263 Wis. 185, 
56 N.W.2d, 782 (1953), for example, plaintiff agreed to perform 
construction work in defendant's basement aimed at eliminating 
water leaks. After the initial agreement was entered and work 
had commenced, defendant alleged that plaintiff warranted to 
him that the basement would not leak, when in fact it did 
leak. The court held that the warranty, even if made, was not 
supported by separate consideration and was therefore not 
enforceable: 
Moreover, the court rightly concluded that even if 
such an agreement had been made, it was subsequent to 
the original contract, and therefore did not consti-
tute a part thereof. As stated in Williston on 
Contracts, Vol. 4, page 2697: "Statements subsequent 
to the bargain cannot amount to a warranty unless 
there is a new consideration." 
56 N.W.2d at 783. Justice Howe, in his concurring opinion in 
the prior appeal of this case, agreed, citing Zimzow: 
I concur, but I believe that on the retrial the court 
will need to find that any express warranty made by 
Tri-0 was supported by legal consideration. I make 
this observation because the alleged express warranty 
claimed by Groen was made by Tri-0 after the contract 
was signed and therefore would have to be supported by 
new consideration. 
667 P.2d at 607 (Howe, J., concurring). 
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Professor Williston also recognizes the principle that 
warranties must be supported by new consideration: 
Consideration, by its very definition, must be given 
in exchange for the promise, or at least in reliance 
upon the promise. Accordingly, something which has 
been given before the promise was made, and, there-
fore, without reference to it, cannot, properly speak-
ing, be legal consideration. As a general principle, 
this is well recognized and illustrations might easily 
be multiplied to show it. Thus, a warranty made after 
a sale as been completed, or an agreement to remove 
encumbrances which a vendor was not bound to do by his 
original contract, is invalid. 
Similarly, a guaranty made after the obligation 
guaranteed has been entered into is invalid without 
new consideration. 
Williston on Contracts § 142 at 620-621 (footnotes omitted). 
Plaintiffs claim that, by agreeing to fly the wire, Groen 
relied on the alleged representations concerning rope strength 
and that, under a theory of promissory estoppel, his reliance 
constitutes consideration for the alleged warranty. The flaw 
in plaintiffs1 argument lies in its necessary characterization 
of Groen's performance of the pre-existing obligation to fly as 
in reliance on the alleged warranty. If such were the case, 
the doctrine that performance of a pre-existing obligation 
cannot constitute consideration for additional promises would 
be rendered meaningless. 
An example is illustrative: Suppose that A contracts with 
B to perform services for B in exchange for B's promise to pay 
a fixed amount. At the time scheduled for performance, A 
notifies B that he will not perform for the stated price, and 
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demands additional compensation, which B agrees to pay. In 
reliance on B's promise, A performs as agreed. The doctrine of 
pre-existing duty precludes A from enforcing the additional 
promise of B even though he technically relied on that promise 
in agreeing to perform. 
The example demonstrates the inconsistency of the doctrine 
of reliance with the rules regarding pre-existing duty. In the 
case at bar, Groen's alleged reliance consisted merely in doing 
that which he and Rocky Mountain Helicopter had already agreed 
to do. Thus, the theory of reliance is inapposite and a show-
ing of new consideration is required. Because no such showing 
was or could have been made, the case should be reversed and 
judgment entered for defendant. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND LACK OF 
MISUSE WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
A jury verdict cannot stand unless there is competent, 
admissible evidence to support it. As this court has noted: 
If there is any substantial competent evidence upon 
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make 
the finding it should stand. But if the finding is so 
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no 
jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the find-
ing, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial 
evidence. 
Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 
1982), quoting Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 
61, 239 P.2d 174 (1951). The district court in the instant 
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case erred in refusing to grant defendant's motions for 
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict based 
on plaintiffs' failure to produce substantial admissible 
evidence to support the proposition that the alleged breach of 
warranty in this case caused the accident and injuries in 
question. 
A. Plaintiffs' Only Evidence Regarding Causation Was the 
Opinion of Gary Flandro, Which Was Without Foundation 
and Was Thus Inadmissible. 
A finding favoring the plaintiffs on causation was war-
ranted only if the plaintiffs proved that their injuries would 
not have occurred without the alleged breach of warranty. 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d at 604. At trial, plaintiffs' 
theory was that defendant had warranted the rope used to be as 
strong as Samson rope and had warranted that it would not 
break. It was undisputed that 3/4 inch Samson rope was 
stronger than 1/2 inch polypropylene rope and would not have 
broken at Groen's speed of 30 miles per hour. It was also 
undisputed that Samson rope lacks the elasticity of polypro-
pylene rope. (Tr. 431, 1122.) Thus, the full load from the 
snag would have been applied more immediately against the heli-
copter frame if Samson rope had been used. Because polypro-
pylene rope was used, and because such rope has more "stretch" 
than Samson, the force from the snag was applied gradually to 
the helicopter frame. Further, if 3/4 inch Samson had been 
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used, the full impact of the snag would have been applied to 
the frame. Because the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope broke, the 
frame was never subjected to the full force of the helicopter's 
momentum applied against the snag. 
Defendant introduced evidence through expert testimony and 
exhibits of Dr. Orloft that, had 3/4 inch Samson rope been 
used, it would not have broken, and at Groen's speed the snag 
would have resulted in structural failure of the helicopter 
(Tr. 1117), which in turn would have aggravated the seriousness 
of the accident by causing the rotor to lose its support and 
rotate either into the passenger compartment or the tail sec-
tion of the helicopter. (Tr. 1123-24, 1126-28.) Dr. Orloft 
was admitted by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Flandro, to be emi-
nently qualified (Tr. 1171-72) and had personally measured the 
air frame, analyzed the air frame members, prepared drawings, 
made calculations and double checked all calculations with a 
computer program. Groen acknowledged that he probably would 
not have survived if the rope had not broken. (Tr. 201.) In 
other words, a more serious accident would have happened if the 
rope used had been the same as 3/4 inch Samson rope. Accord-
ingly, the alleged breach of warranty was not material to 
plaintiffs' injuries. 
The only evidence which plaintiffs introduced in rebuttal 
to defendant's evidence was testimony of Gary Flandro that, 
based on his examination on the witness stand of photographs of 
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the helicopter, without any personal examination or analysis of 
the helicopter or any objective testing (Tr. 1166-68), he felt 
that a bracket shown in the photograph may have failed before 
the failure outlined by Tri-O's expert. (Tr. 1168-69.) 
Tri-0 timely objected to admission of Flandro's opinion. 
(Tr. 1165.) The testimony lacked foundation in that Flandro 
had not examined the helicopter or any specifications, drawings 
or manufacturing data on the helicopter. His entire analysis 
was based on a photograph shown to him in the court room. He 
admitted: 
Q. Do you need to know the strength or size of a 
particular member you are going to say would fail 
before you can say [at] what force it would fail? 
A. I need to know what material it's made of to make 
that, but I could. I think the size of these 
members have already been stated in other testi-
mony and I can then, therefore, in a very similar 
way estimate the area of the structure that's 
being loaded here and make a pretty good conclu-
sion on what breaking loads would be involved, 
yes. (Tr. 1167.) 
Although Flandro admitted he needed to know the material and 
sizes of the air frame members to conclude which member would 
fail, he knew neither. Contrary to his assumption, the size of 
the member had not been stated in other testimony. 
Although Dr. Orloft measured the members and based his 
opinion on his personal knowledge of the size of the members, 
the record is devoid of any statement as to the size of the 
subject air frame members. Because Flandro had no personal 
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knowledge of the size of the members and such facts were not in 
the record, his opinion was without the factual basis he 
admitted was necessary. With respect to the material of which 
the air frame members are constructed, Flandro said he would 
assume the strongest material likely to be used. There was no 
evidence, however, that all air frame members were constructed 
from the same material or had the same strength. Again, a 
necessary factual or foundational basis for his opinion on a 
critical issue was absent. 
Flandro further admitted: 
Q. Now, you indicated that the analysis of this 
structure that Dr. Orloft made you thought was 
rather simplistic, is that right? 
A. It seems to me he's concentrated on just part of 
the structure. And my understanding of things of 
this sort is that you must do a pretty detailed 
analysis to come up with conclusions about which 
parts are going to fail when. 
Q. What portions of the air frame do you think he 
excluded in his analysis? 
A. As I understand it, he particularly focused in on 
the tubing structure which surrounds the motor 
and transmission systems. 
Q. It would be fair to say, wouldn't it, that the 
analysis you have just made is just more simplis-
tic than the analysis Dr. Orloft made? 
A. I would definitely agree with that, yes. 
Q. You admit that the analysis can be made to deter-
mine what member of that helicopter will fail? 
A. Yes, my feeling is that one must look at each 
part of the structure very carefully to make any 
conclusions about where the failures are going to 
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occur and what's going to happen subsequent to 
the failure. 
Q. You wouldn't have any question that Dr. Orloft 
could do that? 
A. I think Dr. Orloft could do that very well, yes. 
Q. And you haven't seen the work he did on that, 
have you? 
A. I have not. (Tr. 1171-72.) 
In spite of Dr. Flandro's admission that to reach a conclu-
sion as to what part of the air frame would fail one "must do a 
pretty detailed analysis," "must look at each part of the 
structure very carefully" and needs to know the sizes of the 
members, his opinion without such foundation was received as 
plaintiffs' sole evidence that the accident would not have 
occurred if the rope had not broken. 
To compound the error, Flandro admitted that even if the 
bracket he pointed out in the photograph failed, serious damage 
would result to the skids of the helicopter and a severe crash 
would result unless the line were released. He had not 
analyzed whether the line would or could be released if the 
bracket failed or whether the release, if any, would occur in 
time to avoid the damage. (Tr. 1169, 1170.) The incontro-
verted evidence was that if 3/4 inch Samson rope were used and 
a snag occurred at 30 mph, the helicopter frame would be over-
stressed in less than 1/2 second. (Tr. 1118.) There was no 
competent evidence as to how fast the line could have been 
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released, if at all, if the frame failed as theorized by 
Flandro. The only competent evidence was that the average 
reaction time for a pilot to trigger the release mechanism is 
.75 seconds. (Tr. 1091.) Accordingly, based on the undisputed 
evidence, whether the air frame failed as analyzed by 
Dr. Orloft or at the bracket suggested by Dr. Flandro, a 
serious crash would have occurred. 
Plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the alleged 
breach of warranty was the cause of the claimed injuries. 
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 
98 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Kuster v. Gould National Batteries, Inc., 
71 Wash. 2d 474, 429 P.2d 220, 227 (1967). See Groen v. 
Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d at 604. Other than the opinion of 
Dr. Flandro, there was no evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that the accident would not have occurred if the rope 
had not broken. The question of whether the accident would 
have occurred with rope as strong as 3/4 inch Samson was one 
which was not within the experience of laymen and which there-
fore required expert analysis. Absent competent, admissible 
expert evidence, the jury could only have speculated as to 
whether the accident or a worse accident would have occurred if 
the rope had not broken. By failing to produce evidence on 
this issue, plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case 
against defendant. That failure requires entry of judgment in 
favor of Tri-O. At minimum, the admission of Dr. Flandro's 
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opinion was prejudicial error and requires reversal and remand 
of the case for a new trial. 
B. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Find as a 
Matter of Law that Groen Misused the Subject Rope. 
The maker of an express warranty is under no external legal 
duty to make the warranty; rather, the warranty is a bargained-
for contractual provision. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 
78, 388 P.2d 399, 401-02 (1964). The scope of the warrantor's 
obligation must be limited to that obligation which he agreed 
to assume,, and liability is premised on the theory that the 
plaintiff used the product within the scope of uses to which 
the warranty applied and was injured when the product failed to 
perform as warranted. Chisholm v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 
628, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1972). Misuse, by definition, is use 
not within the scope of the warranty. Southern Illinois Stone 
Co. v. Universal Engineering Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 452 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
The evidence in this case was overwhelming that Groen's 
speed and method of flying were so unusual as to constitute 
misuse of the rope as a matter of law. Don Lederhos, an expert 
pilot and the inventor of the "side pull method" flown by 
plaintiff in this case, testified that the upper limit of 
safety when pulling sock line is 18 to 20 miles per hour, and 
that the best practice is to fly 10 to 12 miles per hour, 
slowing to 8 miles per hour at the towers, where snags are most 
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likely. Further, the evidence established that the normal 
method of stringing sock line is to lay the lead rope on a "fly 
arm" connected to the power line and specifically designed for 
wire flying operations. The traveler is suspended from the 
steel tower by insulators, and the fly arm extends out approxi-
mately 18 inches at a 45 degree angle to facilitate threading 
the lead rope into the traveler. Defendant's employees on the 
job with Groen had observed other pilots pull sock line at an 
average speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour, and had never seen a 
pilot fly sock line as fast as 30 miles per hour. 
Groen1s speed at the time of the crash was 30 to 35 miles 
per hour. Groen admitted that he was flying 30 miles per hour 
and that he flew as fast as he could go. He further admitted 
that he did not slow down as he approached the tower where the 
snag occurred. Further, the evidence showed that experienced 
pilots do not lay the lead rope against the insulators, because 
they occasionally miss the insulators and lay the rope across 
the tower arms, where snags are most likely. Mr. Lederhos 
testified that an experienced pilot will stop and lift the rope 
off the tower arm if it happens to lodge there. At the time of 
the accident, Groen was not using the fly arm to thread the 
rope into the traveler, but was intentionally laying the rope 
against the row of insulators. At the tower prior to the snag, 
Groen missed the insulators and laid the lead rope on the tower 
arm. Rather than slow down and lift the rope off the tower 
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arm, Groen proceeded at 30 to 35 miles per hour and dragged the 
rope across the steel tower arm until it fell into the 
traveler. Groen employed the same unorthodox procedure at the 
next traveler, but the swivel connecting the lead rope to the 
cable snagged on the tower arm and the rope broke. 
The undisputed evidence is that no pilot except Groen flew 
faster than 20 mph or drug the rope across a tower arm without 
slowing down. Not even Groen testified of such acts by any 
other pilot. Misuse is use of a product in a manner inconsis-
tent with or outside the scope of the warranty. In this case, 
Tri-O's employees could not have foreseen that Groen would 
employ such an unorthodox method of flying, and thus, the scope 
of the warranty could not reasonably extend to Groen's 
methods. Even if Tri-O's employees warranted that the rope was 
adequate for the wire flying operation and would not break, the 
warranty cannot be regarded as unlimited. Rather, it must be 
construed in the context in which it was made. Groen did not 
disclose his unorthodox method of flying, and defendant's 
employees had no reason to anticipate it. Under the circum-
stances, the lower court should have ruled as a matter of law 
that Groen used the rope outside the scope of the warranty and 
that such misuse was the cause of the crash. Had Groen 
employed normal methods, it is undisputed that the rope would 
not have broken and the crash would not have occurred. 
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POINT IV 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS CASE CREATED 
THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT WARRANTIES ARE 
ABSOLUTE AND WITHOUT LIMITATION. 
Instruction numbers 10 through 13 (R. 1541-44), regarding 
limitations on the warranty, had the cumulative effect of con-
veying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject 
to limitation, and inadequately informed the jury that, unless 
the parties contemplated otherwise, objective standards are to 
be applied in determining the scope of the warranty. Those 
instructions are reproduced in the addendum. 
In the case at bar, there was no evidence that defendant 
made the alleged warranty with knowledge of Groen's methods of 
flying, nor was there evidence that any express limitations 
were placed on the warranty. The jury, therefore, was required 
to ascertain the scope of the warranty based upon objective 
standards of foreseeability, <cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205 
(1980), and the instructions regarding scope of the warranty 
were therefore crucial. 
Despite the crucial nature of the instructions on scope of 
the warranty, the instructions, taken as a whole, were unduly 
slanted in favor of the plaintiffs. Instruction number 11 
informs the jury that the person receiving the warranty has no 
duty to ascertain the warranted fact for himself and states 
that the only prerequisite to recovery for breach of warranty 
is injury caused by the warranted fact being proven untrue. 
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Instruction number 12 states that a warranty can exist regard-
less of whether or not the person making the warranty believed 
the warranted fact or had any knowledge of the truth or falsity 
of the warranted fact. Instruction number 13 states that if a 
person intends any restrictions to apply to the warranty, he 
must explicitly state them. The only mention in any of those 
instructions to any objective standard is contained in the last 
half of the last sentence of instruction number 13, where the 
jury is told that the recipient of a warranty may assume that 
there are no restrictions on the warranty unless he is aware of 
restrictions or should reasonably foresee them. The cumulative 
effect of those instructions was to mislead the jury into 
believing that a warranty is absolute and unconditional, and to 
inadequately instruct the jury as to the necessity of determin-
ing the scope of the warranty based upon objective standards. 
In the instant case, there was substantial evidence that 
Groen's method of flying was not contemplated when the warranty 
was given, and indeed was contrary to the normal practices of 
pilots flying wire. (See Point III.B., above). Thus, the 
cumulative effect of instructions 10 through 13 was to preju-
dice the defendant, and a new trial should be granted. 
Additionally, the jury was instructed, over defendant's 
objection, that both parties were found not negligent in the 
prior trial. (Instruction No. 17, R. 1547.) Because of the 
frequent references during the course of this trial to the 
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prior trial, the instruction to the jury that neither party was 
found negligent in the prior proceeding was prejudicial to the 
defendant. It was especially prejudicial given the fact that 
it was contained as part of instruction number 17, relating to 
misuse, because defendant's major theory of defense was that 
Groen misused the rope and because misuse is factually similar 
to negligence, particularly to laymen. The error was com-
pounded by the failure of the court to provide any instruction 
as to the meaning of the term "negligence" and by its failure 
to explain how negligence relates to the issues submitted in 
this trial. In overall effect, the negligence instruction 
eviscerated the instruction that misuse was an issue in this 
case separate and apart from the negligence issue resolved in 
the prior trial. Instructing the jury on the outcome of the 
first trial could only have caused confusion and speculation, 
and thus was prejudicial error. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS 
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD ON 
THE COURT. 
One of the grounds specified in Rule 59, U.R.C.P, for 
granting a new trial is newly discovered material evidence. 
Rule 59(a)(4), U.R.C.P. This court has held that a new trial 
is warranted when the following standard has been met: 
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In order for a new trial to be granted on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence the moving party 
must show: (a) there is material, competent evidence 
which is in fact newly discovered; (b) by due dili-
gence the evidence could not have been discovered and 
produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be 
merely cumulative or incidental but must be of suffi-
cient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that with it there would have been a different result. 
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980) (footnote 
omitted). In this case, that standard has been satisfied. 
Defendant discovered during the trial that plaintiff had 
co-authored a book with his brother entitled Huey. (Supp. R., 
Affidavit of David G. Williams). Defendant introduced the book 
at trial (Exh. D-65) and briefly examined plaintiff Groen about 
the book at the first opportunity after discovering it, but was 
prevented by virtue of plaintiffs' failure to disclose the book 
at an earlier date from adequately discovering further signifi-
cant evidence regarding the book. At trial, Groen testified 
that he had sold approximately 20,000 copies of the book, and 
that, at 9-1/2 cents a copy, he had approximately broken even. 
On the Monday following the trial, the Salt Lake Tribune 
published an article based on an interview with Groen and his 
brother which states that the book had sold 170,000 copies, not 
the 20,000 which Groen claims it had sold, and that it has been 
on several best seller lists. (R. 1576.) After trial, Groen 
denied the newspaper account that 170,000 copies of the book 
had been sold but admitted that over 76,000 copies had been 
sold prior to trial. (Supp. R., Invoice.) 
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Discovery of the book was material. First, it demonstrated 
that plaintiff Groen was and is in fact capable of earning a 
living, whereas his testimony and the testimony of an expert 
witness called by Groen at trial was that he was only qualified 
to work part time as a self serve service station cashier or 
telephone solicitor. Furthermore, if Groen1s testimony that he 
receives 9-1/2 cents per copy can be believed, the 170,000 
copies of the book which the article said had been sold prior 
to trial result in income to Groen of $16,150. The damages 
awarded by the jury were based on evidence that Groen would 
have made approximately $32,000 in 1984 as a pilot. Combined 
with the $10,000 income from his family partnership which Groen 
testified he would receive in 1984, the $16,000 received from 
the book results in a net loss of income from the level Groen 
would have earned as a pilot of only $6,000, rather than the 
$22,000 loss represented by Groen at trial. 
The equity of granting defendant a new trial based on the 
book is further substantiated by plaintiffs' failure to 
disclose the book prior to trial, despite defendant's due dili-
gence in seeking such evidence. The book was published in 
February, 1984, yet at his deposition in December of 1983, 
Groen testified that he had no independent ventures which might 
generate income. In response to questions by defendant's coun-
sel at Groen's deposition on December 27, 1983, less than two 
months prior to publication of the book, Groen repeatedly 
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denied existence of any business venture which might be related 
to the book: 
Q. Okay, have you been involved in any other busi-
ness or income-producing venture since trial? 
A. I formed a company myself called Seagull Press, 
which is — my father's an artist, and I paid to 
have 22 of his paintings printed in the litho-
graphs. (Depo. of David L. Groen, Dec. 27, 1983, 
p. 27.) 
• • • • 
Q. Any other business venture since trial? 
A. No, that's it. 
Q. Any other source of income? 
A. Just my wife. She works. (Id., p. 28.) 
Defendant was entitled to learn about the book prior to 
trial and to conduct such discovery as was necessary to deter-
mine the actual profitability of the book to Groen. Because 
Groen concealed the book, defendant was precluded from seeking 
current sales figure verification from the publisher in time 
for use at trial. 
Groen also concealed the existence of the book during his 
trial testimony until it was marked as an exhibit and presented 
to him. After extensive testimony on direct and cross examina-
tion about his income from work or hobbies, Groen was con-
fronted with the book. His explanation was: "Yes, this is a 
book my brother and I wrote. I forgot. I've been waiting for 
somebody to ask me actually. I hadn't thought of it in this 
last bit of questioning." (Tr. 613.) Only seconds earlier, 
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two questions previous, after all income had been discussed and 
no income from the book mentioned, Groen's testimony was: 
Q. Do you have any particular hobbies that are 
income-producing for you? 
A. I have none at all. (Tr. 612-13.) 
Groen's concealment of the book was material and was ade-
quate ground for a new trial under the rule provision relating 
to newly discovered evidence and as fraud on the court. See 
St. Pierre v. Edmunds, 645 P.2d 615, 618-19 (Utah 1982). 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE A SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY WHICH WAS 
NOT OFFERED UNTIL AFTER BOTH SIDES HAD 
RESTED AND WHICH FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 
CONCESSIONS THE WITNESS MADE ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION. 
The district court erred in admitting exhibit number P-74, 
a summary prepared by plaintiffs' counsel setting forth 
selected portions of the testimony of plaintiffs' economist, 
Dr. Samuel Stewart, regarding the value of Groen's alleged lost 
income. The exhibit was not produced or offered while Dr. 
Stewart was testifying, and therefore could not be contested 
during cross-examination. Further, the exhibit made no mention 
of concessions made by Dr. Stewart on cross-examination, and 
thus unduly emphasized his direct testimony. Defendant timely 
objected to admissions of the exhibit. (Tr. 1186.) 
Dr. Stewart gave results of his calculations based on 
various assumptions, and arrived at estimates of lost income 
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ranging from $550,000 to $1,150,000. (Tr. 637, 638-39.) Dur-
ing cross-examination, he admitted he had not used any discount 
factor in arriving at present value under the various scenar-
ios. (Tr. 644.) He was asked on cross-examination to recom-
pute present value using a discount factor reflecting his judg-
ment of the present spread between the inflation rate and 
interest rates. He did so, and concluded that, applying the 
discount, the present value would be approximately one-half the 
value he had given during his direct examination. (Tr. 661.) 
The exhibit prepared by plaintiffs' counsel and given to the 
jury, however, did not present Dr. Stewart's computations using 
a discount factor and therefore unduly emphasized part of his 
testimony while totally excluding a very material portion of 
his testimony without giving defendant the opportunity to 
demonstrate that exclusion to the jury. The prejudice was 
compounded when, during its deliberations, the jury requested 
additional copies of the exhibit. (R. 1573.) 
The sole basis upon which exhibit P-74 was or could have 
been offered was as a summary of Dr. Stewart's testimony, and 
it was so represented to the jury. A summary of testimony, 
however, must be fair, accurate and complete, at least with 
respect to the subject or issue summarized, or it will mislead 
and will tend to emphasize some testimony to the exclusion of 
other testimony, suggesting the summarized testimony should be 
given greater weight. Because the verdict was substantially in 
-47-
excess of the concessions made by Dr. Stewart on cross-
examination, it was prejudicial error to admit exhibit P-74 in 
the manner done by the trial court. 
POINT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST ON CLAIMED SPECIAL DAMAGES 
WHEN THE JURY RESOLVED THE CASE ON A GENERAL 
VERDICT WHICH DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAMAGES. 
In its judgment, and over defendant's objection, the 
district court awarded plaintiff Groen prejudgment interest on 
"liquidated amounts" (R. 1600), even though the jury made no 
finding regarding special damages and even though the propriety 
and necessity of the claimed special damages was highly con-
tested. The action of the district court finds no basis in the 
facts as found by the jury and thus is erroneous. 
The allowance of prejudgment interest on special damages in 
Utah is of statutory origin. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1977) 
provides that the plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest 
only on special damages: 
In all actions brought to recover damages for 
personal injuries . . . it shall be lawful for the 
plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the 
special damages alleged from the date of the occur-
rence of the act giving rise to the cause of action 
. . . . 
Because the recovery of prejudgment interest is limited to 
special damages, a factual finding regarding the amount of the 
plaintiff's recovery attributable to special damages is 
required before prejudgment interest can be allowed. 
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In the case at bar, the jury resolved the case on a general 
verdict which merely stated the total amount of damages awarded 
to the plaintiffs. The verdict does not reflect the amount, if 
any, attributable to special damages. The propriety and neces-
sity of Groen's special damages, many of which consisted of 
expenses for chiropractic care, which his own expert testified 
could be harmful rather than helpful (Tr. 576-78), was hotly 
contested. Thus, the court could not find as a matter of law 
that the jury intended to award Groen the entire amount of 
claimed special damages. Nevertheless, the court awarded pre-
judgment interest on such amounts. In so doing, the court in 
effect took the issue of special damages from the jury, presum-
ing from the size of the verdict that the jury would have 
awarded the total amount of claimed special damages if the 
issue had been submitted. That action was erroneous. 
This court has ruled in analogous cases that the trial 
court cannot presume that the jury acted in a certain manner 
when the conclusion is not expressly stated in the verdict and 
the party who stands to benefit could have requested that the 
verdict form be structured in a manner preserving the claimed 
right: 
If there is doubt whether the general verdict 
awarded damages for tort, the consequences of that 
doubt must be charged to plaintiff Cook, who had the 
burden of requesting special verdicts to separate the 
two recoveries for purposes of review. 
-49-
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 n.5 (Utah 
1983). In the instant case, plaintiff Groen was the party 
claiming interest on special damages and was therefore the 
party with the burden of requesting that the amounts of special 
and general damages be separated in the verdict form. Because 
of his failure to request that findings be made supporting his 
requested recovery, plaintiff must be charged with responsibil-
ity for the failure of the verdict form to support an award of 
prejudgment interest on special damages. The district court's 
award of prejudgment interest must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant requests that this case 
be reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in its favor. 
In the alternative, defendant requests that the case be 
reversed and remanded for new trial. If the case is otherwise 
affirmed, defendant requests that the district court's award of 
prejudgment interest be reversed. 
DATED this IjJ- day of July, 1985. 
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By 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Jury Instructions, Nos. 10-13. 
2. Exhibit 74-P, "Present Value of Lost Future Earnings." 
3. Judgment on Verdict. 
4. Memorandum Decision. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /Q 
A warranty is an assurance by one person to another person 
of the existence of a fact as opposed to statements expressing 
an opinion or belief. A warranty does not require any particular 
words or phrases in order to be enforceable. Any direct and posi-
tive affirmation of fact that induces another person to act in 
reliance thereon constitutes a warranty. 
Mr. Groen under the parties contract had no obligation to 
fly on the day of the accident if he reasonably and in good faith 
believed that flight under the conditions presented was unsafe. 
To establish/^warranty plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Mr. Groen would not have flownAthe day of the 
accident using the rope provided by the defendant without the 
alleged warranties made to him by the defendant as to the fitness 
of the rope. 
v^-
INSTRUCTION NO. 1\ 
A person receiving a warranty and reasonably relying thereon 
is thereafter relieved of any duty to ascertain the warranted 
fact for himself. The law regards a warranty as the equivalent 
of a promise by the person making the warranty to answer in 
damages for any injury sustained by the recipient of the warranty 
that is proximately caused if the warranted fact proves to be 
untrue• 
INSTRUCTION NO. & 
In determining whether a warranty has been made, 
you need not consider whether the person making the warranty 
believed the warranted fact to be true or untrue. The 
essence of a warranty is the assurance to the recipient and 
his reliance thereon, not the mental impressions of the 
person making the warranty. A warranty can exist regardless 
of whether or not the person making the warranty believed 
the warranted fact or whether such person had any knowledge 
of the truth or falsity of the warranted fact. 
INSTRUCTION NO . \ \ 
If a person making a warranty intends any restrictions 
or limitations on the warranty, he has a duty to explicitly 
state such restrictions or limitations. If any restrictions 
or limitations are not explicitly stated by the person 
making the warranty, then the recipient of the warranty 
has the right to assume that there are no restrictions 
or limitations unless he is otherwise aware of such 
restrictions or limitations or such restrictions or 
limitations should be reasonably foreseen by the recipient 
of the warranty. 
PRESENT VALUE OF LOST FUTURE 
EARNINGS 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 1 
Assumes: 
David Groen will work full time in future 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate 
David Groen will earn between $4.35-5.00 per hour which 
will increase at inflation rate 
Present value of the loss: $650,000 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 2 
Assumes: 
David Groen will work full time in future 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as 
last 5 years 
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour 
which will increase at inflation rate 
Present value of the loss: $1,050,000 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 3 
Assumes: 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate 
Family business will survive and David Groen will 
earn $250 per week which will increase at inflation rate 
Present value of the loss: $550,000 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 4 
Assumes: 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as 
last 5 years 
Family business will survive and David Groen will earn 
$250 per week which will increase at inflation rate 
Present value of loss: $950,000 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 5 
Assumes: 
David will work part-time averaging 5 hours per day 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate 
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour 
which will increase at inflation rate. 
Present value of the loss: $743#750 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 6 
Assumes: 
David will work part-time averaging 5 hours per day 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as 
last 5 years 
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour 
which will increase at inflation rate. 
Present value of the loss: $1,143,750 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 7 
Assumes: 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate 
Family business will survive but David Groen1s salary 
will be decreased to reflect his inability to work more 
than 5 hours a day 
Present value of the loss: $681,250 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 8 
Assumes: 
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as last 
5 years 
Family business will survive but David Groen9s salary 
will be decreased to reflect his inability to work more 
than 5 hours a day 
Present value of the loss: $1,081,250 
NOV 3 01984 
Robert M. McDonald 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
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STATE OF UTAH 
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DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TRI-O, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
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JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Consolidated Civil Nos. 
C-78-3006 and C-79-2990 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
This action came on regularly for trial commencing 
October 30, 1984. The parties appeared through their attorneys: 
Robert M. McDonald of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough representing plaintiff and H. James Clegg and 
David G. Williams of Snow, Christensen and Martineau representing 
defendant. A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled 
and sworn to try said action. Witnesses on the part of 
plaintiff and defendant were sworn and examined. After hearing 
evidence, the argument of counsel, and instructions of the 
Court, the jury retired to consider their verdict, and 
subsequently returned into Court, and being called, answered 
to their names, and say they find a verdict for the plaintiff 
David L. Groen and against defendant in the sum of $975,000.00 
and in favor of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., and against 
defendant in the sum of $37,500.00. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the 
premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
said David L. Groen have and recov£r from Tri-O, Inc., the 
sum of $975,000.00 with interest^at the rate of 6% per annum 
trs \<yAJSk Sum* 
prior to May 14, 1981, and interest^at the rate of 10% per 
annum on and after May 14, 1981 to the date of this judgment, 
the amount of said judgment to hereafter bear interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum together with said plaintiff's costs 
and disbursements incurred in this action. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the pre-
mises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
said Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., have and recover from 
Tri-O, Inc., the sum of $37,500.00 with interest at the rate 
of 6% per annum prior to May 14, 1981, and interest at the 
rate of 10% per annum on and after May 14, 1981 to the date 
of this judgment, the amount of said judgment to hereafter 
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum together with said 
plaintiff's costs and disbursements incurred in this action. 
Judgment entered this -day of November, 1984. 
^ J < ^ VL 
"Dutizj/ d^^jh 
v^ Deputy Cler 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Dixon H. Hindley, Clerk of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, in and for the County 
of Salt Lake , do hereby certify that the foregoing is 
a full, true and correct copy of the judgment entered in 
the above-entitled action. 
Witness my hand and Seal of the Court, at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 3cfe day of November,1984. 
H. WXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
GENERAL VERDICT /> rlD^ SOC^/g 7? -J?/ 
We the jury find in favor of the plaintiffs, and award 
damages to plaintiff Groen in the sum of $ ^ T^^f QOO' OO, 
and damages to Rocky Mountain Helicopter Inc. damages in the 
sum of $37,500.00. 
DATED: ^OV. <9j ^ S ^ 
FOREMAN 
DEC 41984 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC, 
a Utah corporation, : CIVIL NOS. C-78-3006 
C-79-2990 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
TRI-O, INC., a Utah : 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
The Court heard argument on the defendants Alternative 
Motions for a New Trial or a Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict on the 30th day of November, 1984. The 
plaintiffs were represented by Robert M. McDonald, Esq., the 
defendant by H. James Clegg, Esq., David G. Williams, Esq., 
and Rodney Parker, Esq. After hearing the arguments of counsel, 
the Court took the matter under advisement in order to review 
the record referred to, and the authorities cited. The Court 
is now prepared to rule on the defendant's Motions. 
This matter was tried to a jury beginning on October 30, 
1984. The trial was a lengthy one, and substantial expert testimony 
was involved. The defendant now claims that errors of law were 
made by the Court, and that the weight of the evidence does 
not support the verdict of the jury. 
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1. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
A. STANDARD APPLIED. 
The Court has considered the issues raised by defendant's 
alternative Motions as to the evidence presented to the jury 
following the standard set forth in Wellmen v. Noble, 12 Utah 
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961) as to the granting of a new 
trial. The Court agrees with counsel for the defendant that 
it is a substantial and serious responsibility of the trial 
court to review jury verdicts, acting as a safety valve to protect 
against unsupported and unjust jury verdicts. The Court has 
examined each issue to see if "it seems clear that the jury 
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts, 
or misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence." Id., at 704, in determining 
whether a new trial should be granted. The same evidence has 
been considered on defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict 
or a JNOV, but the higher applicable standard has been applied. 
B. MISUSE OF THE PRODUCT. 
The defendant claims that the jury disregarded substantial 
evidence establishing that the defendant had misused the rope 
at issue. The defendant over objection of the plaintiff was 
given ample opportunity to develop its theory of the case that 
the plaintiff Mr. Groen had flown too fast, and had used an 
inappropraite method when stringing the wire on the date of 
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the accident. The defendant's evidence in fact focused on this 
point throughout the trial. However, there was substantial 
credible evidence to the contrary presented by the plaintiff 
and other knowledgeable helicopter pilots. It was uncontested 
that the task of stringing wire by helicopter is an art, and 
that each pilot develops his own technique. Furthermore, it 
was clearly established that the plaintiff was expert in this 
technique, and had had a successful career stringing wire on 
power projects. 
The Court clearly instructed the jury that "if they found 
that the plaintiff used the rope in a manner or under conditions 
which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant" 
the plaintiff was barred from recovery. The defendant contends 
that the Court's inclusion of a sentence in Instruction No. 17 
that "negligence is not a defense to a breach of warranty where 
it simply puts the warranty to the test" led the jury to error. 
The Court is not persuaded. The defendant skillfully and persua-
sively presented the defense of misuse of the product to the 
jury, and the Court feels that the jury was not confused or 
misled by the statements concerning negligence in Instruction 
No. 17. The Court felt it was necessary to include reference 
to the prior finding of no negligence because of repeated reference 
to the first trial in this action by both the defendant and 
the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The Court also finds 
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defendant's argument that subsequent conduct of a party is not 
relevant to determine the original scope of a warranty is without 
merit. 
C. CAUSATION OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The defendant claims that plaintiff did not produce 
sufficient competent evidence to rebut the defendant's claim 
that the accident would have occurred regardless of whether 
the rope in question broke. The defendant admits that Dr. Gary 
Flandro, the plaintiff's expert, disputed the defendant's theory 
that if the rope had not broken, the helicopter would have suffered 
serious structural damage, in any event. The jury had the testimony 
of two competent experts who disagreed as to the causation issue. 
The jury chose to rely upon the plaintiff's theory. The Court 
does not find the jury's conclusion to be contrary to the weight 
of the evidence. Furthermore, the Court finds that the jury 
instructions, when taken as a whole, reflect the correct statement 
of the law of breach of express warranty and misuse of product. 
II. CONSIDERATION 
The defendant argues that the facts presented to the jury 
and the instructions given by the Court were insufficient to 
establish the consideration required to support plaintiff's 
claim. The parties agree that the plaintiff's theory of consider-
ation was promissory estoppel. The Court finds that the requirements 
of promissory estoppel were established. The Court did not 
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submit the issue as to whether the warranty in question that 
the Msampson rope was as strong as the rope requested and would 
adequately do the job1' was of the type of promise that the defendant 
should reasonably expect to induce action on the part of the 
plaintiff. It was the Court's opinion and still is, that if 
the jury found that the alleged warranty had been made, that 
it was as a matter of law the type of statement upon which the 
defendant should expect that the plaintiff would rely. 
The Court further notes that the parties agreed that the 
plaintiff had no obligation to fly the helicopter on the day 
in question if he reasonably felt the conditions were unsafe. 
Thus, the plaintiff did not have a pre-existing obligation to 
fly, and the Court so instructed. The Court specifically in 
Instruction No. 10 told the jury that they must find that "Mr. Groen 
would not have flown on the day of the accident using the rope 
provided by the defendant without the alleged warranties." 
The defendant cites Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 
15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1964) for the proposition 
that the Court's instructions were not sufficient on the issue 
of consideration. The defendant states that the Court did not 
specifically instruct that (1) the defendants were aware of 
all material facts; (2) that in such awareness they made the 
promise; (3) they knew that the plaintiff was acting in reliance, 
on the promise; and that (4) the plaintiff observing reasonable 
i± 
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care acted in reliance, producing the injury. The Court never 
received an instruction phrased as such. More important, the 
Court notes that the instructions when read as a whole, specifically 
Instructions No. 10, 13 17, and 18 outline each of the elements 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court finds 
that based upon the facts presented at trial, that injustice 
could only be avoided by an application of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in this case. 
III. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
The fact that plaintiff Groen co-authored a book with his 
brother entitled Huey is not newly discovered evidence. The 
book was introduced at trial, and the plaintiff was questioned 
at length by the defendant concerning it and the profits made 
from its sale. Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that 
any evidence produced as to actual sales of the book -- the 
prejudice complained of — would have had any material outcome 
on the verdict. Finally, the Court notes that the failure of 
the plaintiff to give accurate sales figures was as much the 
fault of the defendant for failing to request current sales 
figures verification from the publisher. 
IV. EXCESSIVE VERDICT. 
The defendant c la ims that the $975,000.00 verd ic t awarded 
by the jury to the p l a i n t i f f was e x c e s s i v e , and the r e s u l t of 
p a s s i o n . The defendant complains that the verdic t was higher 
i 
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than that awarded in the first trial. However, the evidence 
was substantially different because of the passage of time, 
and the unsuccessful efforts made by the plaintiff to mitigate 
his pain and incapacity. Furthermore, the Court is persuaded 
that two different juries will almost always disagree on the 
precise value of damages, and that this disagreement alone is 
not sufficient to challenge the verdict of either juries. 
The defendant further complains that Exhibit 74-P was submitted 
to the jury in error. This exhibit simply illustrated in graphic 
form the lengthy and complex testimony of the plaintiff's damage 
expert, Dr. Stewart, and the Court believes that it was helpful 
to the jury/^understanding his testimony. Furthermore, the Court 
received numerous illustrative exhibits from the defendant, 
and would have received any exhibit illustrative of the defendant's 
theory of damages which was supported by competent testimony. 
The damage figure arrived at by the jury was supported by and 
within the damages testified to by the plaintiff, and by his 
damage expert, Dr. Stewart. The Court does not find that the 
award was so excessive as to merit a new trial — the relief 
requested by the defendant. 
Based upon the above, the defendant's Alternative Motions 
for a New Trial, a Directed Verdict, or a Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict are denied. The Court instructs counsel for the 
plaintiff to prepare Findings and Conclusions, and an Order 
3^03 
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in conformance with the Court's Memorandum Decision, and to 
submit them to counsel for the defendant, and then to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this 3rd day of December, 1984. 
fclTH M. B I L L I N G S ^ JU 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
i** t T£ST 
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